PRECONDITIONS OF AUGUST WAR 2008

Abstract

One part of the Georgian society sees the reason of the complicated relationship between Russia and Georgia in the expressionistic policy of the Russian government leaders, the other part sees the rough errors of the Georgian politicians. In all cases we see the attempt of the one-sided explanation of that complicated event, which makes narrow the range of investigation of its origin‟s reason, makes impossible its valuable and perfect analysis.
Russia could not accommodate to the fact of Georgia‟s strive to the west and had decided to punish excellently. In the 2008 August war Russia‟s concrete goals were the next: 1. The full control establishment on the whole territory of the former South Ossetia‟s autonomic district; 2. To help Abkhazia‟s government to fully control Gali‟s district populated primarily with Georgians and drive out the Georgian efforts out of the Kodori ravine; 3. To create the safe zone controlled by Russians in the west part of Abkhazia‟s and Georgia‟s other part‟s border; 4. To compel Georgia to sign the official document about refusing of effort use; 5. Humiliate Saakashvili and to have him under constant press inside Georgia; 6. To destruct all the possibility of Georgia‟s membership in NATO whenever Georgia was preparing for the war with Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists (but no with Russia). Saakashvili team hoped that they could return the occupied territory using strong blitz-crieg way. These considerations were strengthened by the next motives: 1. The bloodless solution of the Adjaria‟s problem, when Russia did not interfered between Georgian central government and its region. 2. The success of the “tornado” operation in Bosnia during war realized by Zagreb, when Croatia returned its lost territories, and NATO did not protest this because the new reality was supporting the conflict regulation; the belief of Saakashvili that weakened Russia could not respond adequately to that step of Georgia; 4. The purposely leaked information by Russia‟s government that Russia “was not interested in the South Ossetia”; 5. The leaders of Georgia believed that they could not find better ally in the USA administration, than the Bush administration, that‟s why it was better to make decisive moves; 6. In the 2008 to the idea of Saakashvili blitz-crieg added one serious motive: in the election of the 2008 5 January Saakashvili won with few advantage, and it was obviously made by use of government levers. In order to return the popularity the best way was to partly reconstruct the country‟s wholeness. Russia could bait the Georgian government on the provocation. Saakashvili really started wade-scale military acts against Ossetian separatists. As for Russian-Georgian war, it was started undoubtedly by Russia, which with its regular army invaded sovereign territory of the country.